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“Federalism was the means and price of the formation of the Union.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The government created by the U.S. Constitution is a federal re-
public or a federation of states, not a unitary national democracy. Fed-
eralism—and its protection of the political liberties of we the people of
the several states—is secured in three distinct ways by the Constitu-
tion: First, the Constitution preserves the states as sovereign political
entities2 and binds only those states that chose to ratify the Constitu-
tion.3 Second, the Constitution limits national power by enumeration
and specifically reserves to the states and we the people of the several
states all “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion.”4 Third, the Constitution “[gives] the states a role of great impor-
tance in the composition and selection of the central government.”5
The primary focus of this Article is on this third point concerning the
structural provisions of the Constitution which give to the states—and
to we the people of the several states—the power to protect liberty and
local self-government by controlling the selection of those who would
wield national authority.
Elections in the United States are federally democratic as opposed
to nationally democratic. We have no national elections in the United
States. Every election for national office is held in the states. Congress
is elected in districts in the states, and members represent not
America but the citizens who reside in their individual districts in
their particular states.6 Senators are elected in the states, and each
senator represents the citizens of his or her particular state.7 Moreo-
ver, there is no national popular election for President; rather, there
are fifty separate state elections for the Presidential Electors from
1. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 543 (1954). Professor Wechsler’s short but seminal article has been a
wonderful source of inspiration for my work on this Article. It should be widely
read today by anyone interested in federalism and the structural architecture of
the Constitution.
2. Id. (noting that the Constitution “preserved the states as separate sources of au-
thority and organs of administration”).
3. Article VII of the U.S. Constitution provides: “The Ratification of the Conventions
of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution be-
tween the States so ratifying the Same.” U.S. CONST. art. VII.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. As Professor Wechsler puts it, the makers of the Constitu-
tion “undertook to formulate a distribution of authority between the nation and
the states.” Wechsler, supra note 1, at 543–44.
5. Weschler, supra note 1, at 543.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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each state.8 Thus, there is no such thing under the Constitution as a
national “popular vote” for President. When members of the media
write stories about the “popular vote,” they arrive at this number only
by adding up the votes of the state elections.9 However, since the Pres-
ident is not elected in a national election but by fifty-one separate elec-
tions in the fifty states plus the District of Columbia, there is no
national “popular vote” for President.
The purpose of this Article is to consider how the structural archi-
tecture of the Constitution delicately balances the incredible power of
a central government wielding the sword of the Supremacy Clause10
against the continued sovereignty of the states and the liberty of we
the people of the several states. These “political safeguards”11 of the
Constitution not only protect us from the danger of too much concen-
trated national power being imposed on the people and the states, but
they also balance the relative power of large-population, medium-pop-
ulation, and small-population states, as well as of states that may not
share the political and cultural values of economically and culturally
powerful states.
The genius of the Constitution is that it created a national govern-
ment which, although supreme within its enumerated powers, is
checked by the interests and liberties of we the people of the states by
the requirement of a strong consensus among the states with respect
to the selection of all three branches of the national government. In-
deed, even the text of the Constitution itself is law only because it has
been ratified in the states, with each state having an equal vote.12
The primary focus of this Article will be to attempt to understand
how the electoral vote system for the Presidency, the structure of rep-
resentation in the U.S. Senate, and the ratification process of Article V
protect federalism and the rights, interests, and liberties of we the
people of the several states. This Article argues that these political
guardrails are not obsolete appendages of the eighteenth century but
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. As Madison put it,
“The immediate election of the President is to be made by the states in their
political characters.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 197 (James Madison) (Gideon
ed., 2001).
9. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA
34–35 (2004). “As reported and generally understood in the United States, the
popular vote is determined by taking the number of votes cast by the people on
Election Day for each slate of electors in each state . . . and then adding up the
totals on a national basis.” Id. at 34. Thus, there is no such thing as a formal
national “popular vote” for President because there is no national popular elec-
tion for the Presidency.
10. Article VI of the Constitution provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See Wechsler, supra note 1.
12. U.S. CONST. art. V; id. art. VII.
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are as—or more—important today in our coast-to-coast, pluralistic, di-
verse, and hopelessly divided states of America.13
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND FEDERALISM
BY CONSENSUS
The U.S. Constitution was conceived and negotiated under the
shadow of the Supremacy Clause.14 Going back to 1787, when the
Constitutional Convention was getting underway, there were thirteen
sovereign states, some of which were large-population states, some of
which were medium, and some of which were small. And the people in
these states were asked to ratify a Constitution pursuant to which
they would yield some of their sovereignty to a new national govern-
ment under a Supremacy Clause that makes clear that laws enacted
by the national government “shall be the supreme Law of the land.”15
Although the thirteen states were already loosely joined together
under the Articles of Confederation, it was obvious that the Articles
were incapable of creating a true nation of united, sovereign states.
Indeed, “barely a decade after declaring independence, nearly all
Americans agreed that the system under the Articles was failing. The
Congress, lacking any true powers, could accomplish next to nothing,
and the states squabbled like so many petty fiefdoms.”16 With the
young nation “on the verge of collapse,” the Constitutional Convention
was called “out of a sense of urgency and desperation.”17
There were many fundamental differences and disagreements
among the colonies that became the thirteen original states.18 How-
ever, perhaps the most crucial difference among the states at the Con-
13. The cover of Time magazine’s “Person of the Year” issue in December 2016 de-
clared Donald Trump, “President of the Divided States of America,” as its person
of the year. The Choice, TIME, Dec. 19, 2016, http://time.com/magazine/us/45949
40/december-19th-2016-vol-188-no-25-26-u-s [https://perma.unl.edu/XWH8-
5V43].
14. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. Id. To be more precise, the Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
16. MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUC-
TION 3 (2015). For a thorough discussion of the flaws in the Articles of Confedera-
tion, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 11–72 (2016).
17. PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 16, at 8.
18. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 13. These differences included economic, relig-
ious, and ethnic differences, as well as strong disagreements over the issue of
slavery. See id.
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vention was the issue of “how to apportion representation in the
national legislature” among the large-population and small-popula-
tion states.19 The large-population states, of course, favored “popula-
tion-based representation in Congress.”20 However, with the prospect
of a much more powerful central government being created by the
Constitution, other states were legitimately concerned about “the pos-
sible hegemony of large states in popular elections.”21 These latter
states wished to be “armed with some power of self-defense”22 against
the larger states and argued that “an equal vote in each state was
essential to the federal idea and was founded in justice and
freedom.”23
These fundamental differences between the large and small states
concerning representation in Congress nearly caused the enterprise of
the Constitutional Convention to fail.24 For example, James Madison,
from the large-population state of Virginia, argued that a national ma-
jority ought to have power to rule and “insisted that anything other
than a population-based apportionment would be ‘confessedly un-
just.’”25 However, the small states “remained insistent upon securing
equal state representation in at least one house of Congress, and they
threatened to abandon the convention—and, if necessary, the union—
rather than relinquish their position.”26 The intensity of the debate is
captured dramatically by the passionate rhetoric of Gunning Bedford,
the delegate from tiny Delaware. Bedford responded to charges that
the small states were being unreasonable by stating that the large
states were seeking “an enormous and monstrous influence.”27 Star-
19. Id. at 127. The large-population states—“most notably, Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and Massachusetts”—also relied on the self-interest of the “underpopulated
southern states of Georgia and South Carolina” based upon the widely shared
assumption “that southern states would soon experience large population gains.”
Id. at 182–83.
20. Id. at 182.
21. RICHARD CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 226 (1970).
22. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 188–89 (quoting William Samuel Johnson of
Connecticut).
23. See id. at 188 (quoting Luther Martin of Maryland).
24. Id. at 127.
25. Id. at 184. Remarkably, Madison also insisted that “too much stress was laid on
the rank of the states as political societies.” Id. at 186.
26. Id. at 192; ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 77 (1994) (“The Delaware delega-
tion warned that any suggestion that the small states might lose their equal
voting power would result in Delaware’s immediate departure from the Conven-
tion.”); see also id. at 74 (“Rhode Island refused to send any delegates, and the
Delaware delegate ominously presented credentials that ‘forbade the delegation’s
participation in any attempt to change the one state, one vote provision of the
Articles of Confederation.’”).
27. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 192.
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ing directly at the delegates from the large-population states, he
continued:
[T]hey [the large states] insist that although the powers of the general govern-
ment will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the whole; and although
the three great states form nearly a majority of the people of America, they
will never hurt or injure the lesser states. I do not, gentlemen, trust you.28
A. The Great Compromise and Equal Representation in the
Senate
As John Dickinson of Delaware had predicted during the early
days of the Convention, the great debate between the larger states
and the smaller states resulted in a “mutual concession.”29 The Great
Compromise of 1787—also known as the Connecticut Compromise be-
cause it was proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut30—was
adopted after “a month of anguished deliberations.”31 Under this
Compromise, the U.S. Congress was created as a bicameral legislature
with one house—the House of Representatives—apportioned by popu-
lation32 and the second house—the Senate—composed of two senators
from each state, with “each Senator having one vote.”33 Moreover, the
Convention adopted an additional protection for the small states when
“the delegates decided without debate or opposition to make
unamendable, without the consent of every state, the provision guar-
anteeing equal state representation in the Senate.”34 Although some
modern scholars refer to the Senate as an “evil” and “egregious insti-
28. WILLIAM PETERS, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 96–97 (1987); see also HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 77 (explaining
the “emotional outbursts” exhibited by delegates on the issue). Professor Klar-
man calls Gunning Bedford’s outburst perhaps “[t]he low point in the conven-
tion’s proceedings” and goes on to note that he stared directly at the large-state
delegates when he spoke of distrusting them. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 193.
However, modern friends of federalism owe a great debt of gratitude to the Gun-
ning Bedfords of the Convention for their steadfast defense of democracy in the
states, or what Martin Diamond calls “federal democracy.” See Martin Diamond
& Birch Bayh, The Electoral College and the Idea of Federal Democracy, 8 PUB-
LIUS J. FEDERALISM 63 (1977).
29. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 194–95.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 195.
32. Id.
33. See id. Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution provides: “The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legisla-
ture thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Under the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate is now elected by
the people of each state rather than chosen by the state legislatures. U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII.
34. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 201. Article V sets forth a procedure for amendments
to the Constitution but explicitly states that “no State, without its Consent, shall
be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. V.
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tution” created by “the extortionate demands of small states,”35 other
scholars recognize that since the small states were negotiating the
terms of their submission to a powerful central government, they were
wise to insist that they would not “cede this sovereignty without some
assurance that they would be treated fairly in the new government.”36
In other words, the purpose of the Senate is to protect federalism and
the liberties of we the people of the several states by giving each state
(whether large or small) an equal voice when the Senate considers
taking action governing the citizens of each state under the
Supremacy Clause.37
B. The Great Compromise 2.0: The Electoral System for the
Presidency
In 1787, the Americans who had fought a revolution to overthrow
the tyranny of King George were “generally suspicious of executive
power.”38 The delegates to the Convention were creating a new type of
executive for the central government, and there was much debate
about how the executive should be selected. As one scholar has said:
“The result was a compromise shrouded in vagueness.”39
Some delegates favored congressional selection of the President.40
But others feared “the trappings of monarchy attending congressional
choice.”41 Direct popular election of the President was frowned upon
for a number of reasons, but perhaps the principal objection was that
“the smaller states would be disadvantaged” by this method of select-
ing a chief executive wielding so many mighty powers.42
As one scholar of the Presidency has put it, the problem facing the
delegates was this: “In a nation composed of both large and small
states that have ceded some, but not all, of their sovereignty to a cen-
35. Sanford Levinson, If We Have an Imperfect Constitution, Should We Settle for
Remarkably Timid Reform? Reflections Generated by the Phenomenon of “Tea
Party Constitutionalism” and Randy Barnett’s Particular Proposal for a “Repeal
Amendment” Designed to Reign in an Overreaching Congress, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 271, 275 (2011).
36. TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 32
(2d ed. 2012).
37. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 213.
39. CLAUDE, supra note 21, at 225.
40. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 214 (discussing the Virginia Plan, which called
for “a national executive to be chosen by the national legislature for an unspeci-
fied term of years, without eligibility for re-election”).
41. See CLAUDE, supra note 21, at 225.
42. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 228. Another oft-expressed reason for the Con-
vention’s opposition to direct popular election of the President was distrust by the
delegates of the electorate. Id. Moreover, southern states were concerned that
popular election would disadvantage “southerners because their slaves would
count for nothing in this method of selection.” Id.
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tral government, how should an Executive be selected?”43 The answer
to this question, the “brainchild of the constitutional convention,”44
was a selection process for President that, in the words of Alexander
Hamilton, if “it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an
eminent degree all the advantages the union of which was to be
wished for.”45
The electoral system for selecting the President was the work of a
“grand committee”46 of the Convention composed of one member from
each state.47 Basically, the electoral system was the product of mutual
give and take “that incorporated the principles of the ‘Great Compro-
mise’ struck earlier in the Convention.”48 As set forth in Article II of
the Constitution, there is no national election for President.49 Instead,
the President is selected by a system of electors appointed in each
state “as the Legislature thereof may direct.”50 The number of electors
(i.e., of electoral votes) in each state is “equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the state may be entitled.”51
To protect the federal character of the process from national influence,
the Constitution further provides that “no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an Elector.”52 Once the electors are chosen, they
cast their ballots, and the person having the greatest number of elec-
toral votes is elected President, so long as that person receives a ma-
jority of all electoral votes.53 If no person receives a majority of
electoral votes, the President will be elected by a majority vote in the
House of Representatives with each state delegation in the House hav-
ing one vote.54
Interestingly, the delegates to the Convention believed that it
would be rare for the President to be chosen by electoral votes because
“nineteen times in twenty” no candidate would receive a majority of
electoral votes.55 This, of course, would result in the President being
chosen in the House of Representatives on the basis of state equality
of suffrage. Thus, the vote of the electors would amount to a nominat-
43. ROSS, supra note 36, at 33.
44. Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L.
REV. 195, 199 (2004).
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001).
46. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 230.
47. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 164
(1913).
48. ROSS, supra note 36, at 33.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
50. Id. § 1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
54. Id.
55. CLAUDE, supra note 21, at 226; KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 232.
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ing process, and the final selection of the President would be in the
House “where the smaller states would have equality with the larger
ones.”56 Although today the rise of the two-party system practically
guarantees an electoral-vote majority for one of the two major-party
candidates,57 the Constitution was designed to go a long way toward
equality for the smaller states in the selection of the President.
C. Article V and Constitutional Change by Consensus in the
States
One final feature of the beautiful architectural design of the Con-
stitution, written by the delegates to the Convention in 1787, is Article
V and its process for amending the Constitution.58 What gives the
Constitution legitimacy—both the original Constitution and the sub-
sequent amendments thereto—as the highest law of the land, the one
body of law that rules all other laws, is the requirement of ratification
by a strong consensus of we the people of the several states.59 Under
Article VII, the original Constitution would only become binding law
when ratified by nine of the original thirteen states, and it would bind
only “States so ratifying the same.”60 Moreover, under Article V, the
56. CLAUDE, supra note 21, at 226. “Indeed, it was only because most of the delegates
assumed that most elections would finally end up in a contingency election [in
Congress] that the compromise was accepted . . . .” HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at
82. Under the original Constitution, if no candidate received a majority of electo-
ral votes, the House of Representatives would choose the President from the five
highest electoral vote recipients. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Under the Twelfth
Amendment, the House chooses the President from among the three highest elec-
toral vote recipients. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
57. See Boudreaux, supra note 44, at 208–11. As Professor Boudreaux observes, the
“vote for electors” has today become “a choice among the parties, with electors
being merely the conduit.” Id. at 209. Moreover, “[i]n every election since
1824 . . . the Electoral college has produced a winner.” HARDAWAY, supra note 26,
at 3.
58. Article V of the Constitution provides, in the pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
sary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when rati-
fied by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. V.
59. See Richard F. Duncan, Justice Scalia and the Rule of Law: Originalism vs. the
Living Constitution, 29 REGENT L. REV. 9, 14–15 (2016).
60. U.S. CONST. art. VII. As Madison observed:
[T]he constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the
people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose;
but . . . this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct
and independent states to which they respectively belong. It is to be the
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Constitution may only be revised when an amendment is proposed by
a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress and then ratified by
three-fourths of the several states.61 These requirements are designed
to ensure that the Constitution is binding on the states and upon we
the people of the several states only when there is a “strong consensus
among the states” that a constitutional rule is necessary.62
This “undemocratic feature”63 of the Constitution, like the Senate
and the electoral system for electing the President, ensures that the
central government’s power may be exercised only as a product of a
strong consensus among the states, whether small or large, whether
economically and culturally powerful or not, whether cosmopolitan or
parochial. As Professor Klarman observes, a constitutional amend-
ment can be blocked by “[t]hirty-four senators from the seventeen
smallest states” or by “the legislatures of the thirteen smallest states,
which together constitute less than 4 percent of the nation’s popula-
tion.”64 Moreover, this process is not “undemocratic”; it is federally
democratic as opposed to nationally democratic. Rather than submit
proposed constitutional revisions to a national popular referendum,
the Constitution submits them to the elected representatives of the
people in the several states and requires a consensus among the states
before the constitutional revision becomes the law of the land.65 Be-
cause the Constitution trumps state laws and even state constitu-
tions,66 Article V’s ratification requirement protects federalism and
the right to be governed locally as opposed to remotely.67
assent and ratification of the several states, derived from the supreme
authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act,
therefore, establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a fed-
eral act.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 8, at 196 (James Madison). Moreover,
Madison emphasized that only states ratifying the Constitution would be bound
by it because “[e]ach State, in ratifying the constitution, is considered as a sover-
eign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act.” Id. Thus, the legitimacy of the Constitution is derived from the assent of we
the people in the sovereign states that ratified the Constitution, which clearly
demonstrates that it is “a federal, and not a national constitution.” Id.
61. U.S. CONST. art. V.
62. See Duncan, supra note 59, at 15. As Professor Monaghan explains: “Article V
was thus a compromise between two competing policies—the Constitution must
possess a sensible mechanism for change, but the terms of the union among the
states were not to be readily altered.” Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s],
Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121,
144 (1996).
63. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 627.
64. Id. at 628.
65. U.S. CONST. art. V.
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67. Article V reflects “a purer statement of the Founders’ ideal of constitutional
change. The instrument embodied their concept of federalism. The national legis-
lature could propose change, but any reform would have to be approved by the
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III. THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL “SOLAR SYSTEM”
PROTECTING FEDERALISM
So the point I make is that when all these factors are considered, it is not only
the unit vote for the Presidency we are talking about, but a whole solar sys-
tem of governmental power. If it is proposed to change the balance of power of
one of the elements of the solar system, it is necessary to consider all the
others.68
—Senator John F. Kennedy
In 1956, Senator (later President) Kennedy explained how propos-
als designed to replace the electoral system with a national direct elec-
tion of the President would strike a powerful blow against federalism:
“I believe,” said Kennedy, “it would break down the Federal system
under which most States entered the Union, which provides a system
of checks and balances to insure that no area or group shall obtain too
much power.”69 Senator Kennedy’s powerful insight concerning the
structural architecture of the Constitution’s allocation of power was
true in 1956 when he expressed it, it was true in 1787 when the Foun-
ders created our constitutional solar system, and it is no less true to-
day. The remainder of this Article will seek to demonstrate the
persuasiveness of Kennedy’s argument in favor of the Constitution’s
electoral vote system for election of the President.
Although some critics of the electoral system for selecting the Pres-
ident refer to its support of federalism as “meager,”70 this fails to
grasp the reality of Senator Kennedy’s multi-planet vision of a consti-
tutional “solar system” of federalism. Just as there are eight planets in
the solar system Earthlings physically inhabit,71 there are at least
eight planets protecting federalism in the constitutional solar
system:72
states . . . .” DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 1776–1995, at 43 (1996).
68. 102 CONG. REC. 5150 (1956) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Then-Senator Ken-
nedy’s powerful point—that the electoral system for the Presidency is just part of
a carefully balanced “solar system” concerning the importance of the states in the
selection of those who would govern us at the national level—captures the beauty
of the constitutional architecture’s provision of checks and balances between na-
tional power and the rights and liberties of we the people in the several states.
See HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 157–58.
69. 102 CONG. REC. 5159 (1956) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see HARDAWAY, supra
note 26, at 157–58.
70. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 44.
71. Solar System, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia
.org/entry/Solar_System [https://perma.unl.edu/N2LY-3PVF] (last modified Nov.
15, 2016).
72. See generally HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 111.
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1. Every election for national office is held in the states, in a fed-
erally democratic election in which each voter in each state gets
one equally weighted vote;73
2. Although representation in the House of Representatives is al-
located on the basis of population, each state is given an equality of
suffrage in the Senate and no state may be deprived of its equal
representation in the Senate—not even by a constitutional amend-
ment—without its consent;74
3. The President is elected in fifty-one separate elections in the
fifty states plus the District of Columbia under a formula that
gives smaller states somewhat more representation than larger
states;75
4. If no candidate for the Presidency receives a majority of electo-
ral votes, the election is determined in the House of Representa-
tives with each state delegation in the House having one vote;76
5. Supreme Court Justices, other federal judges, and all other of-
ficers of the United States must be nominated by a President
elected in the states under the electoral system and confirmed by
the Senate in which each state has two senators elected in their
respective states;77
6. The President has the power to make treaties so long as “two
thirds of the Senators concur”;78
7. Ordinary national laws require a majority vote in both the
House and the Senate, and the President has the power to veto
laws which may be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both the
House and the Senate;79 and
8. The Constitution may not be amended unless three-fourths of
the states ratify a proposed amendment.80
As Senator Kennedy understood, if you unravel one thread from
the architecture of this carefully balanced constitutional solar system,
you may create a disturbance in the force that might cause the entire
structure to collapse.
73. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. V; id. amend. XIV, § 2; see supra notes 29–37 and
accompanying text.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII.
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
80. U.S. CONST. art. V. Each state, of course, has an equal vote when ratifying pro-
posed constitutional amendments.
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A. The United States Senate: Veto Points and Federalism
Under the Great Compromise of the Constitutional Convention,
the United States Senate was to be “composed of two Senators from
each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . ; and each Senator
shall have one Vote.”81 Thus, the Senate was designed to protect fed-
eralism and state equality in two respects: First, each state—no mat-
ter how large or how small—has an equality of suffrage in one house
of our national legislature.82 Second, the Constitution was designed to
give state legislatures a direct role in the selection of U.S. Senators,
essentially giving the states a veto of national laws through selection
of their ambassadors to the Senate.83 Madison put it this way in the
Federalist Papers:
The house of representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America, and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on
the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far
the government is national, not federal. The senate, on the other hand, will
derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these
will be represented on the principle of equality in the senate, as they now are
in the existing congress. So far the government is federal, not national.84
Although under the Supremacy Clause national law trumped state
law, the states were given a powerful check on national law through
appointment of one house of the Congress. No national law could be
enacted unless the representatives of the states in the Senate
concurred.
However, in 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified and
altered the selection process of U.S. Senators. It provides, in the perti-
nent part, that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.”85 Essen-
tially, the Seventeenth Amendment democratized the selection pro-
cess for the Senate by removing the power from the state legislatures
and transferring it to the citizens of each state. Nevertheless, in the
words of Madison, the Senate still derives its powers from the states
“as coequal societies”;86 however, now the source of those powers is
“the supreme authority in each State,”87 the “people thereof.”88
Progressive legal scholars hold the Senate in contempt precisely
because of its embrace of federalism and the equality of the states.
Professor Sanford Levinson, for example, refers to the Senate as an
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 8, at 197 (James Madison).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 8, at 197 (James Madison).
87. Id. at 196. In the language quoted in the text, Madison was referring to ratifica-
tion of the Constitution by the people in each state.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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“evil”89 and “egregious institution”90 that bestows too much influence
on the small states, particularly on the “small parochial rural states in
which most Americans do not live.”91 Professor William Eskridge ar-
gues that state equality in the Senate is undemocratic and “distrib-
utes political benefits from the rest of the country to the fourteen
‘sagebrush states’ of the West and Great Plains.”92 No doubt these ru-
ral, parochial states with their “[s]agebrush values”93 are the kinds of
places President Obama was thinking of in 2008 when he spoke of
“bitter” small-town voters who “cling to their guns or religion or antip-
athy to people who aren’t like them.”94 Suzanna Sherry even ventured
so far as to refer to the Senate as an institution that “is in conflict with
the most basic principles of democracy underlying our Constitution
and the form of government it establishes.”95 Never mind that the
Constitution established the Senate as an institution designed to pre-
serve federalism and state equality96 and explicitly provides “that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate,” not even by means of a constitutional amendment.97 Lev-
inson has attempted to delegitimize the Great Compromise and the
solar system of checks and balances that it established concerning the
larger and smaller states by describing the principal of equal repre-
sentation in the Senate as resulting from “the extortionate demands of
Delaware and other small states.”98
Perhaps Levinson’s real problem with the Senate is that it enables
smaller states and their “parochial” values99 to block national legisla-
tion favored by larger states and their cosmopolitan values. For exam-
ple, Levinson actually complains about the checks and balances that
are a “central reality of the American Constitution” because they cre-
ate “many different veto points with regard to blocking the wishes of
89. Levinson, supra note 35, at 275.
90. Id.
91. Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, at A14 (quoting Sanford Levinson), http://www.ny-
times.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html.
92. William N. Eskridge Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clauses, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 35, 36 (William N. Eskridge & Sanford
Levinson eds., 1998).
93. Id. at 37.
94. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jeff Zeleny, On the Defensive, Obama Calls His Words Ill-
Chosen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/us/
politics/13campaign.html.
95. Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 92, at 95, 95.
96. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. CONST. art. V.
98. Sandford Levinson, So Much to Rewrite, So Little Time . . . ., 27 CONST. COMMENT.
515, 520 (2011).
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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even an energized majority.”100 If only California had 140 senators to
outvote Wyoming’s two senators,101 national majorities could enact
national legislation that, under the Supremacy Clause, would be the
law of all fifty states.102 But of course, that is precisely the point of the
Constitution’s many veto points and checks and balances. As Justice
Scalia once said, we “should learn to love gridlock”103 in Congress be-
cause the Constitution was designed to prevent “an excess of legisla-
tion”104 by checking the power of national majorities. In other words,
the Senate is designed to protect we the people in the several states
from excessive national legislation by requiring a strong national con-
sensus among the larger and the smaller states before new national
laws are enacted. The checks and balances of the American Constitu-
tion were created under the shadow of the Supremacy Clause to pro-
tect the people in the states from precisely the kind of controversial
majoritarian laws that Levinson and Eskridge celebrate.
But what of the argument that the Senate violates fundamental
values of the Constitution because it is undemocratic and not consis-
tent with the norm of one person one vote?105 The short answer is that
the Senate was designed to be “federally democratic” as opposed to
“nationally democratic.”106 Elections for the Senate “are as freely and
democratically contested as elections can be—but in the states.”107
The candidate with the most votes always wins an election for the
Senate—“but in the states.”108 Each voter in Wyoming and each voter
in California has an equal vote in Senatorial elections—but in her re-
spective state! As Jay Bybee observes:
100. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 52 (2006).
101. Id. at 51 (noting the unfairness of the Senate’s bestowing two senators on both
California and Wyoming even though “California has just short of seventy times
the population of Wyoming”).
102. Id. at 52. Levinson bemoans the fact that “the Senate can exercise a veto power on
majoritarian legislation passed by the House that is deemed too costly to the in-
terests of small states, which are overrepresented in the Senate.” Id. Similarly,
Professor Eskridge complains that the “Sagebrush values” of the small states do
not embrace national laws supported by “sexual-orientation minorities.” Es-
kridge, supra note 92, at 37. Finally, Sherry objects that “Justice Thomas still sits
on the United States Supreme Court, despite the fact that the representatives [in
the Senate] of a majority of the population voted against him.” Sherry, supra note
95, at 96.
103. David G. Savage, Justice Scalia: Americans “Should Learn to Love Gridlock,”
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-
scalia-testifies-20111005 [https://perma.unl.edu/63Q9-T2XZ].
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
106. See MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DE-
MOCRACY 7 (1977) (emphasis omitted). Diamond refers to elections for the Presi-
dent; however, the same is true for Senate elections.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Federalism and democracy are not in opposition in Congress any more than
they are in the Electoral College; they work in concert to hold the relation-
ships among the national government, the states, and the people in constitu-
tional equipoise. Neither is federalism a competitor to democracy, but its
willing servant. Federalism suggests to the democratic impulse that it should
confine itself to local rather than to national resolution; that uniformity of
government is not required and may, therefore, not be demanded. Thus, feder-
alism is a different manifestation of democratic will: Democracy demands that
individual voices be heard; federalism asks, “How great the din?”109
The Constitution creates the Senate to check national power and to
advance federalism by ensuring that each state in the union has an
equal voice in one branch of the national government.110 Indeed, a
federally democratic Senate is more “democratic” than a nationally
democratic Senate in at least one important respect—election of Sena-
tors at the state level ensures that each Senator is more likely to re-
present his statewide electorate than would be the case if we had a
national election for the Senate. Each Senator elected to represent
Wyoming in the Senate is a resident of Wyoming and was elected by
the people of Wyoming. Thus, she is more likely to reflect the regional
and cultural values of her electorate—the people of Wyoming—than
would be the case if Senators were elected by a national electorate.
And the same is true for California and Colorado and Nebraska and
North Carolina. State equality in the Senate gives an equal voice to
“sagebrush values”111 in Wyoming and Hollywood values in Califor-
nia. In the words of Justice Scalia, the Constitution establishes a na-
tional government in which “power contradict[s] power”112 to ensure
that national laws are only enacted when they represent a consensus
among the larger and smaller states and the respective cultural and
political values of the various regions of our large and pluralistic na-
tion. Thus, rather than contradict the fundamental values of the
American Constitution, the Senate’s embrace of federalism and state
equality in one house of Congress reflects and embodies the checks
and balances that protect the liberty of we the people of the several
states.
B. The Electoral Vote System, Democracy, and Federalism
In a thinly reasoned but widely cited report on the electoral vote
system, the American Bar Association Commission on Electoral Col-
lege Reform criticized the “electoral college method” for electing the
President as “archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect,
109. Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song
of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 504 (1997).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
111. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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and dangerous.”113 The ABA report recommended amending the Con-
stitution to provide for direct election of the President and Vice Presi-
dent by a “nationwide popular vote.”114 Similarly, Sanford Levinson
has attacked the Electoral College as “an undemocratic and perverse
part of the American system of government.”115 This criticism of the
electoral vote system as “undemocratic” basically tracks the attack on
the Senate and its guarantee of equal representation of the states. As
Levinson puts it, both parts of the Constitution’s structural architec-
ture provide “indefensible advantages . . . to low-population states.”116
Moreover, the electoral vote system “allows a person to become Presi-
dent with fewer popular votes than his major opponent.”117
As in the case of the Senate, it is important to realize that the real
issue is whether the Presidential election should be “nationally demo-
cratic” or “federally democratic.”118 Under Article II, Section 1, the
legislature of each state is given nearly plenary power over the ap-
pointment of presidential electors.119 Thus, the electoral system is to
the Presidency what the Senate was to Congress before ratification of
the Seventeenth Amendment.120 However, the legislature of every
state has decided to have democratic state elections for the Presidency
in which electoral votes are decided based upon which candidate wins
the popular vote in each particular state.121 Moreover, with the excep-
tion of two states, these elections are “winner-take-all” contests in
which the winner of the popular vote in each state receives all that
state’s electoral votes.122
The Presidential elections in each of the fifty states are not anti-
democratic; they are federally democratic—each voter in each state
election gets one vote, and each vote counts the same within each
state. “Victory always goes democratically to the winner of the raw
popular vote—but in the states.”123 The purpose of having individual
113. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESI-
DENT 3–4 (1967) [hereinafter ELECTING THE PRESIDENT].
114. Id. at 3.
115. LEVINSON, supra note 100, at 82.
116. Id. at 89.
117. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, supra note 113, at 4.
118. See supra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
120. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
121. Although in the early days of the republic “most state legislatures chose to select
the electors themselves” without an election, since 1865 every state legislature
has chosen to allow direct election of presidential electors by the eligible voters of
each respective state. HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 45–46.
122. Id. at 48–49. This “winner-take-all” feature is not mandated by the Constitution;
rather, it was enacted by the state legislatures in the forty-eight states that em-
ploy it. Id. The two states that have not adopted this “unit” rule for electoral
votes—Maine and Nebraska—have instead chosen to allow voters to vote for elec-
tors “on a district basis rather than on a statewide basis.” Id.
123. DIAMOND, supra note 106, at 7.
816 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:799
states decide electoral votes is to require a candidate to appeal to the
citizens of many states across the country—in multiple regions repre-
senting people with a diversity of values and ideas about the “good
life”—and to ensure that the small states in flyover country have an
important role in electing the President. In other words, the electoral
system functions as a counterweight against the powerful forces of na-
tionalization of law and politics. In the words of Professor Diamond,
“When all forces tend to homogenization and centralization, we have a
saving remnant of decentralization in the Federal aspect of the elec-
tion of the American President.”124
Together with the constitutional structure for Congress (and espe-
cially the U.S. Senate), the electoral vote system ensures that the
states—and we the people of the states—have a vital role in selecting
all three branches of the national government.125 In the Federalist
Papers, Alexander Hamilton praised the electoral system for the pres-
idency as “excellent,” and explained its excellence as follows:
This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of president
will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed
with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of
popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honours of a single
state; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to estab-
lish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable
a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for
the distinguished office of President of the United States.126
Thus, election to the Presidency ordinarily requires a candidate to ap-
peal to we the people in many states and regions of the country. Or, as
Professor Wechsler once put it, the Constitution assigns to the states a
“crucial role in the selection and the composition of . . . national au-
thority” in order to ensure that “the states are the strategic yardsticks
for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of po-
litical activity, [and] the separate geographical determinants of na-
tional as well as local politics.”127
In other words, the road to the White House passes through the
states. The people of Wyoming may be few in number and they may
embrace parochial Sagebrush values, but on Election Day they get to
determine who wins the three electoral votes that Wyoming is allo-
cated under the Constitution. Regardless of what happens in Califor-
124. Diamond & Bayh, supra note 28, at 69.
125. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 546.
126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 45, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton).
127. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 546. As Professor Wechsler further observes, in order
to win the Presidency, candidates “must appeal to some total combination of alle-
giance, choice or interest that will yield sufficient nation-wide support to win
elections and make possible effective government.” Id. at 557; see also ROSS,
supra note 36, at 81 (noting that the electoral system requires presidential candi-
dates to “achieve a consensus among enough groups, spread out over many
states, to create a broad-based following among the voters”).
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nia, New York, or any other state, the people of Wyoming get to
determine who wins their state’s three electoral votes.
Of course, since the states have chosen to adopt a “winner-take-all”
unit rule for state elections for the Presidency, this necessarily means
that in state presidential elections the votes of those who support los-
ing candidates are unsuccessful. Critics of the electoral vote system
assert that this results in “cancelling all minority votes cast in the
state.”128 This argument is totally without merit. As in all elections,
the votes for unsuccessful candidates for the presidency do not bear
fruit. But these votes are not “cancelled.” Each vote in each state is
counted in each state. The winning candidate in each state is awarded
all that state’s electors.129 The unit rule serves federalism by ensuring
that presidential elections in the states, even in small, parochial
states such as Wyoming, have maximum impact on the election of the
president. Forty-eight state legislatures have adopted the unit rule for
this very reason.130 It is a feature—not a fault—of the Presidential
electoral system as a vital cog in the Constitution’s protection of feder-
alism and the rights and liberties of we the people of the states.
Some modern critics of the electoral system attack it because state
legislatures no longer directly appoint electors but rather have em-
powered the people in each state to elect presidential electors pledged
to particular candidates nominated by the political parties.131 Al-
though the Framers may not have anticipated this process of democra-
tization of presidential selection, they carefully designed an electoral
system that delegated to state legislatures “the task of developing the
methods and criteria for electing [presidential] electors.”132 Thus, the
electoral vote system in operation today is “the final result of 200
years of evolution and trial and error, made possible by the flexibility
the Constitution so wisely provided.”133 Both federalism and democ-
racy have been enhanced by these changes because the current pro-
cess for choosing the president now clearly “safeguards democracy
where it is, and can be, most genuinely democratic, namely, in the
states.”134 This flexibility of the electoral system is a strength, not a
128. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, supra note 113, at 4.
129. Interestingly, a national popular election for the Presidency would also result in
minority votes being “wasted” or “cancelled” in the sense that votes for losing
candidates never bear fruit. Losing votes count, but they do not prevail. This is
how elections work, and it is not a case of disenfranchisement of losing voters.
130. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
131. See Boudreaux, supra note 44, at 208 (“Most of the eighteenth century rationales
for the electoral college have been rendered irrelevant by the rise of parties and
laws generated by modern partisan politics.”).
132. HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 87.
133. Id.
134. James R. Stoner Jr., Federalism, the States, and the Electoral College, in SECUR-
ING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 43 (Gary L. Gregg ed.,
2001). Moreover, for most Americans, the states are where they live their lives,
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weakness, of the constitutional design. It is the opposite of being
archaic and obsolete; it allows for change and the “refining [of] the
electoral process”135 without sacrificing the checks and balances of
federalism. It is indeed an excellent system that has resulted in mean-
ingful and federally democratic elections for president in each of the
several states.
Thus, the electoral system promotes federalism in two important
respects. It promotes federalism as state sovereignty by making clear
that the state legislature of each state has nearly plenary power to
determine the selection process for presidential electors. And because
all fifty states now provide that presidential electors are to be chosen
by popular elections in each state,136 it protects the “supreme author-
ity” of we the people in the states by giving the citizens of each state
the power to determine the electoral votes from their particular
state.137 This is not “meager” federalism as some commentators as-
sert.138 Rather, it is a critically important “means of preserving Fed-
eral democracy, or a Federal element in the electoral process.”139
Moreover, the political benefits of electoral-system federalism do
not depend upon the states in which Presidential candidates physi-
cally campaign or place political advertisements.140 The benefits that
matter are those that deeply protect federalism by assuring that an
appeal to the people of many states and regions of the country is nec-
essary for a candidate to win the presidency. The electoral system en-
sures that all fifty states matter because federally democratic
worship their God, and raise their families. For these Americans, their “states
are most emphatically home.” Id. at 51. This is true even in a mobile society in
which many of us move from place to place. Eventually, most of us put down roots
and live our lives in the particular state we call home. See id. As for me, I was
born in Massachusetts, spent a few years in New York, and eventually put down
deep roots in a “Sagebrush” state, my beloved Nebraska. I am an American by
birth, but my home (and the place where I vote and where I wish my vote to
count) is Nebraska. Go Big Red!
135. HARDAWAY, supra note 26, at 97.
136. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, supra note 113, at 23.
137. As Madison declared, the “supreme authority in each State” is that of we the
people in the relevant state. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 8, at 196 (James
Madison).
138. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 44 (“[T]oday’s electoral college allows for at
best a meager federalism, in which states are merely addresses in the national
government.”).
139. Diamond & Bayh, supra note 28, at 69. As Diamond explains, the President is
best understood not as our “chief national executive officer,” but rather as “our
chief Federal officer” elected by fifty-one separate elections in each of the fifty
states plus the District of Columbia. Id.
140. Some critics of the electoral system argue it fails to protect the interests of the
states because candidates limit campaign activities to competitive states. See,
e.g., GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA
151 (2004). As discussed in the text, this misses the point about what really mat-
ters in a federalist republic.
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elections in each state determine which candidate receives each state’s
electoral votes. This forces candidates to seek consensus by taking ac-
count of the values, policy preferences, and opinions of those who live
in rural areas as well as urban areas, in coastal areas as well as in the
heartland of America. In other words, “[h]aving to go to the people, not
as an undifferentiated mass, but in their states, makes candidates
aware of, if not always sympathetic to, the whole array of interests
articulated principally at the local level.”141 The 2016 Presidential
election, for example, primarily concerned what Americans from coast
to coast think about important national issues such as nominations to
the Supreme Court, religious liberty, illegal immigration, trade policy,
jobs for the working class, and gun rights. Although these issues are
in one sense national, they are viewed very differently in sagebrush
America than in cosmopolitan America. The genius of the Framers in
designing the architecture of the Constitution to submit issues like
these to voters in the states is enduring, and the most recent presiden-
tial election is powerful evidence of that genius.
C. The Electoral System Works Well: The 2016 Presidential
Election as a Case in Point
Although many supporters of Hillary Clinton probably believe she
“won” the 2016 election because she won a plurality of the so-called
popular vote by approximately three million votes, the 2016 election is
actually a powerful example of the enduring value of the electoral sys-
tem established by the Constitution in 1789. As discussed above, the
Constitution creates the electoral system in order to ensure that the
chief executive of the United States represents not just a few heavily
populated regions of the country but rather an electoral-vote majority
representing many states in and multiple regions across the coun-
try.142 In the election of 2016, President Trump won the “popular
vote” in thirty of fifty states and in over 2600 counties from coast to
coast, while Hillary Clinton won only twenty states and less than five
hundred counties.143 Clinton was the choice of the wealthy, culturally
powerful, and heavily populated east and west coastal regions and a
few urban areas in between,144 whereas President Trump was the
141. Stoner, supra note 134, at 51–52.
142. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
143. Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017)
[hereinafter Election Results], https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/presi-
dent (state map).
144. “We know the basic facts about 2016. Thriving metropolitan areas leaned toward
Hillary Clinton while less affluent and less diverse places in the interior of the
country voted for Donald Trump.” E.J. Dionne Jr., Is America Getting Lonelier,
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-ameri
ca-getting-lonelier/2017/08/06/411522a6-7933-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story
.html?utm_term=.822ed355557a [https://perma.unl.edu/3JQZ-K7YB]. Another
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choice of thirty states and more than 2600 counties covering the entire
expanse of America.145 Remarkably, President Trump’s victory over
Clinton in the counties was a victory of more than five to one, with the
President winning the vote in 2626 counties and Clinton winning only
487 counties.146
Another way of looking at the “popular vote” argument for Clinton
is this: Clinton won a plurality (not a majority, but a plurality) of the
so-called popular vote by 2,868,519 votes—call it a three million vote
lead over Trump.147 But if we subtract her margin in California of
4,269,978 votes,148 Trump actually won the “popular vote” in the other
forty-nine states by approximately 1.5 million votes. And if we sub-
tract Clinton’s margin in both California and New York of a little over
six million votes, Trump wins the other forty-eight states by more
than three million votes.149 This is not meant to imply that votes in
New York and California do not count; they very much count to deter-
mine who won the electoral votes in California and New York. Rather,
my purpose is merely to demonstrate that two large, coastal states can
dominate a national election for the presidency, which is exactly what
Gunning Bedford of Delaware feared in 1787 when he told the dele-
gates from the large states that he could not allow his state to submit
commentator put it more dramatically: “Of all the overlapping generational, ra-
cial, and educational divides that explained Trump’s stunning upset over Hillary
Clinton last week, none proved more powerful than the distance between the
Democrats’ continued dominance of the largest metropolitan areas, and the stam-
pede toward the GOP almost everywhere else.”  Ronald Brownstein, How the
Election Revealed the Divide Between City and Country, ATLANTIC (Nov. 17,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/clinton-trump-city-
country-divide/507902 [https://perma.unl.edu/QG8G-ZBRW]. Rasmussen Reports
provided a much more detailed analysis of the urban–rural divide in the 2016
election. See Rhodes Cook, The 2016 Presidential Vote: A Look Down in the
Weeds, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/political_commentary/commentary_by_rhodes_cook/the_2016_
presidential_vote_a_look_down_in_the_weeds [https://perma.unl.edu/MR6P-
QDGD].
145. See Election Results, supra note 143 (select “President,” then navigate to the
“Counties” map).
146. Trending Story that Clinton Won 57 Counties is Untrue, AP NEWS (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://apnews.com/fb5a5f7da21d460bbffb6985cb01cb2c [https://perma.unl.edu/
33RF-UYH2] (“The Associated Press finds that Clinton won 487 counties nation-
wide, compared with 2,626 for President-elect Donald Trump.”).
147. Clinton’s “popular vote” total was 65,853,625 votes (48.0%) and President
Trump’s was 62,985,106 votes (45.9%). Clinton’s advantage was thus 2,868,519
votes. See Election Results, supra note 143.
148. Clinton’s vote total in California was 8,753,788. President Trump’s vote total in
California was 4,483,810. Thus, Clinton won in California by 4,269,978 votes. Id.
149. Clinton’s vote total in New York was 4,556,124. President Trump’s vote total in
New York was 2,819,534. Thus, Clinton won in New York by 1,736,590. Id.
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to the “enormous and monstrous influence” of a few large-population
states.150
Moreover, Trump won the vote in the Electoral College by a com-
fortable majority of 304 Electoral Votes to 227 for Mrs. Clinton—basi-
cally a fifty-five percent majority.151 So rather than a President
Clinton who won a “popular vote” plurality by dominating in a handful
of large and powerful states and urban centers, we have a President
Trump who won an electoral vote majority based upon an overwhelm-
ing consensus in the states and counties that comprise this large and
diverse nation.
Clearly the best case scenario is when a presidential candidate
wins both an electoral vote majority and a “popular vote” majority.
However, in elections like that of 2016, in which one candidate wins
only a “popular vote” plurality and another wins a strong consensus in
the states and counties together with a solid electoral vote majority,
the electoral system created by the Constitution works well. Whatever
your views about President Trump’s character and populist agenda,
when you look at the remarkable 2016 electoral map of the United
States depicting how the counties voted,152 it is clear that President
Trump was the nationwide-consensus choice of the American presi-
dential election of 2016.
D. A Narrative from the Classroom: Is the Constitution’s
Structural Architecture Archaic and Obsolete?
The Constitution, though it dates from the founding of the Republic, has pow-
erful meaning and vital relevance to our own times. The constitutional protec-
tions that this case involves are protections of structure. Structural
protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of
powers—are less romantic and have less obvious a connection to personal
freedom than the provisions of the Bill of Rights or the Civil War Amend-
ments. Hence they tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It
should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our
people that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most
important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the original
Constitution and not left to later amendment. The fragmentation of power
produced by the structure of our Government is central to liberty, and when
we destroy it, we place liberty at peril.153
An ABA Report calls the electoral system for the presidency
“archaic.”154 A distinguished constitutional scholar calls it “a brilliant
150. PETERS, supra note 28, at 97; see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
151. See Election Results, supra note 143.
152. See infra Appendix.
153. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 707 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
154. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, supra note 113, at 3.
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eighteenth-century invention that makes no sense today.”155 Like-
wise, Sanford Levinson believes that state equality in the Senate is
obsolete because “there is no such present necessity to submit to the
extortionate demands of small states lest they torpedo the entire con-
stitutional project.”156
The point of the critics seems to be that the political compromises
made in 1789 to create a constitutional union are no longer necessary
to preserve that constitutional union. But the compromises that
formed the structural protections of the Constitution are enduring,
and the political guardrails of federalism and national government by
consensus continue to protect the vital political liberties of we the peo-
ple of the states.
When I teach about the structural protections of federalism, I often
ask students to think about what would happen if, as Jefferson sug-
gested,157 the Constitution had an expiration date of, for example, De-
cember 31, 2018. Thus, all fifty states would become free and
independent states once again unless all fifty states could be con-
vinced to ratify a new national Constitution.
I then ask the students to assume the roles of delegates from the
state of California at the Second Constitutional Convention of 2018
and ask, What would they want in terms of the composition of the
national government and the election of the President? What would be
the price of California’s vote to ratify?
But then I ask them to imagine they represent Wyoming or Ne-
braska or South Dakota or Mississippi at the Convention. Now what
would they want? Remember, if all fifty states do not agree to ratify
the new Constitution, there will not be a United States of America.
Thus, we need a compromise that will work for all fifty states—small
and large and in between; rural, suburban, and urban; red and blue
and purple. What would that compromise look like?
Of course, all of the delegates from all of the states would have
knowledge of how divided the nation has become and how large states
155. Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 92, at 15.
156. Levinson, supra note 35, at 275.
157. 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 634 (James Morton Smith ed.,1995). Jefferson
believed that the dead have no right to govern the living. Id. at 632. Thus, each
generation has the right to govern itself. Writing to Madison, from Paris, on Sep-
tember 6, 1789, Jefferson put it this way:
The constitution and the laws of their predecessors [are] extinguished
then in their natural course with those who gave them being. Every con-
stitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If
it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right.
Id. at 634; see also DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 304 (1994) (discussing Jefferson’s argument that “no society can make
a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law”).
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such as California and New York can dominate a national popular
election.158 Moreover, the delegates would be aware of the chasm that
exists today between Hollywood values and sagebrush values, be-
tween cosmopolitan values and rural values. Although all of the dele-
gates to this hypothetical constitutional convention would be
Americans, differences in values, religion, and ideology would make it
difficult for them to accept being governed by those representing the
other side of the chasm. As Gunning Bedford of Delaware said in 1787
to the delegates from the large-population states, we do not trust each
other enough to submit to a political hegemony of one group or the
other.159
Even setting aside hot-button issues such as abortion, same-sex
marriage, gun rights, and the scope of religious liberty, it is not clear
today that all fifty states could agree to a plan about the structure of
the national government. Restoration of the union of all fifty states
might prove elusive. But if a compromise acceptable for ratification by
all fifty states could be worked out at the Constitutional Convention of
2018, it would probably look a lot like the Great Compromise of
1789—larger states get representation by population in the House,
smaller states get equal representation in the Senate, and there would
be some type of compromise in how the President is elected. In fact,
the current allocation of electoral votes—California is allocated fifty-
five electoral votes and Wyoming only three—is too favorable to the
large population states. For example, in 1789, the largest state to
smallest state electoral-vote ratio was ten to three; in 2016, it was
fifty-five to three.160 The delegates representing Wyoming or Ne-
braska in the Second Constitutional Convention of 2018 would be wise
to demand that small states have a minimum number of electoral
votes, perhaps no fewer than 10 or 15. Of course, delegates from large
states would be opposed to that demand. It would indeed be no small
158. See, e.g., supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
160. In 1789, the largest state, Virginia, had ten electoral votes, and the smallest
state, Delaware, had only three. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 1789–1808 (Feb. 6, 2017), https://nationalmap.gov/small_scale/printa-
ble/images/pdf/elections/elect01.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZEA3-WESK]; Electo-
ral Votes for President & Vice President 1789–1821, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & REC.
ADMIN. (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.archives.gov.federal-register/electoral-col-
lege/votes/1789_1821.html#1788. In 2016, the largest state, California, had fifty-
five electoral votes, and the smallest state, Wyoming, had only three. See Distri-
butions of Electoral Votes, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & REC. ADMIN. (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/allocation.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/8BXX-JLEC]. There were six other states (in addition to
the District of Columbia)—Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, and Vermont—with only three electoral votes in 2016. Id. Thus, California
by itself had fifty-five electoral votes and the seven smallest states combined had
only twenty-one electoral votes.
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task to find an electoral system for the presidency that could be rati-
fied by all fifty states in today’s bitterly divided America. It is a bless-
ing that Jefferson’s idea about an expiration date for the Constitution
did not prevail.
Thus, the electoral-vote system is most definitely not obsolete in
contemporary America—small-population states in flyover country
would be irresponsible to submit to a national government dominated
by large-population centers in a handful of states. The electoral-vote
system is not perfect, but it is excellent—it ensures that we get a pres-
ident who represents a broad, multi-regional, electoral majority of our
nation, as opposed to only a few large-population centers. As one
scholar of the electoral system has explained, the structure embodied
in the Constitution “prevents local needs from being ignored, controls
dangerous factions, and requires a balancing of interests.”161 It is per-
haps even more relevant in today’s bitterly divided America than it
was in 1789.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a far flung, free society, the federalist values are enduring. They call upon a
people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist their common perils and advance
their common welfare, without undue sacrifice of their diversities and the cre-
ative energies to which diversity gives rise.162
The U.S. Constitution was created under the shadow of the
Supremacy Clause. Since it would unite only those states which chose
to ratify it, it had to be designed in a way that took account of the
interests of all thirteen original states, whether small or large, rich or
poor, cosmopolitan or parochial. The result was an architectural mas-
terpiece—a Constitution that tempered a powerful national govern-
ment, supreme within the scope of its authority, with the political
safeguards of federalism, of the checks and balances that assigned to
each state a powerful role in the selection of those governmental offi-
cials who would wield national authority.
Under the electoral system for the presidency, candidates under-
stand that although the large-population states are prizes to chase,
they must also seek victory in a sufficient number of the smaller
states to “yield sufficient nation-wide support to win elections and
make possible effective government.”163 However, the electoral sys-
tem for the presidency is just one planet in a solar system of structural
checks and safeguards created by the Constitution to balance the su-
preme power of the central government against the interests of the
161. ROSS, supra note 36, at 39. Moreover, the Framers believed that the “federalist
republic” created by the Constitution “would be the best protection for individual
freedom.” Id.
162. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 543.
163. Id. at 557.
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several states and the rights and liberties of we the people of the sev-
eral states.164 This constitutional solar system of political guardrails
protects federalism and liberty by delegating to the states, and to the
voters in each state, the power to select public officials who would
wield national authority.
Although critics of the U.S. Senate—in particular of its unamend-
able principle of state equality—and the electoral system for the presi-
dency argue that these structural provisions of the Constitution are
undemocratic and anti-majoritarian, these arguments fail to recognize
the distinction between institutions that are nationally democratic
and those that are federally democratic. All elections for national of-
fice are based upon democratic elections in the states in which the vot-
ers of each state have an equal voice in the election of candidates who
seek to represent the relevant state in the national government. The
voters of each state vote for that state’s representatives in the House,
the Senate, and the presidential Electoral College. Each citizen’s vote
counts the same within each state.
This Article has shown the many ways in which the structural ar-
chitecture of the Constitution delicately balances the incredible power
of a central government wielding the sword of the Supremacy Clause
against the continued sovereignty of the states and the liberty of we
the people of the several states. These checks and balances of the Con-
stitution protect Americans not only from the danger of too much con-
centrated national power being imposed on the people and the states,
but they also balance the relative power of large-population, medium-
population, and small-population states, as well as of states that may
not share the political and cultural values of economically and cultur-
ally powerful states. The genius of the Constitution is that it created a
national government which, although supreme within its enumerated
powers, is checked by the interests and liberties of we the people in
the states by the requirement of a strong consensus among the states
with respect to the selection of all three branches of the national gov-
ernment. These structural checks and balances are not obsolete ap-
pendages of the eighteenth century but are as—or more—important
today in our coast-to-coast, pluralistic, diverse, and hopelessly divided
states of America.
It is important to recognize that these process protections of feder-
alism, although critically important and enduring in their relevance,
are but part of the Constitution’s protection of federalism and the lib-
erties of we the people in the states. The Constitution also limits na-
tional power by enumeration and specifically reserves to the states
and to we the people of the several states all “powers not delegated to
164. See supra notes 68–80 and accompanying text.
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the United States by the Constitution.”165 Reserved-powers federal-
ism, although beyond the scope of this Article, is critically important
to liberty because it allows many issues to be decided locally and, thus,
closer to the people subject to local laws and local lawmakers. It also
allows citizens to choose among fifty different shopping carts filled
with different arrangements of laws, taxes, benefits, and protected lib-
erties. “Instead of centrally designed and enforced regimes, federalism
offers choice. Instead of a voice, it offers citizens an exit—and, in due
course, better government.”166 Process federalism gives states a say in
how national power is exercised. Reserved-powers federalism—“fifty
shades of federalism” as one might label it—gives citizens the right to
be consumers of government, to run toward states with laws they like
and from states with laws they dislike.167 Both process federalism and
reserved-powers federalism protect liberty by localizing political
power.
To end this Article where it began with the words of Herbert
Wechsler, the structural architecture of government created by the
Constitution “and especially the role of the states in the composition
and selection of the central government” is enduringly valuable and
“intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions
by the[national government] on the domain of the states.”168 Like all
great architectural masterpieces, the structural architecture of the
Constitution should be preserved and protected from those who would
tear it down and replace it with a parking lot.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
166. MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 8
(1999).
167. Id. at 2–9. As Greve observes, “the advantages of citizen choice extend not only to
economic matters, but also, and with equal force, to social or lifestyle issues.” Id.
at 4.
168. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 558.
2018] GOVERNMENT BY CONSENSUS 827
APPENDIX
The following maps, generated by the New York Times, illustrate the
strong national consensus in favor of President Trump in the 2016
presidential election, both at the state and county levels.
Figure 1: 2016 Presidential Election State Map169
169. Election Results, supra note 143 (state map).
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Figure 2: 2016 Presidential Election County Map170
170. Election Results, supra note 143 (select “President,” then navigate to the
“Counties” map).
